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Lord Atkin Page 1

 

Lord
Buck-
master.
Lord
Atkin.
Lord
Tomlin.
Lord
Thanker-
ton.
Lord
Macmillan.

M’ALISTER or DONOGHUE (Pauper)

v.

STEVENSON

Lord Atkin.

MY LORDS,

    The sole question for determination in this case is legal: do the averments made by the pursuer in her pleading if true disclose a cause of action? I need not restate the particular facts. The question is whether the manufacturer of an article of drink sold by him to a distributor in circumstances which prevent the distributor or the ultimate purchaser or consumer from discovering by inspection any defect is under any legal duty to the ultimate purchaser or consumer to take reasonable care that the article is free from defect likely to cause injury to health. I do not think a more important problem has occupied your Lordships in your judicial capacity: important both because of its bearing on public health and because of the practical test which it applies to the system of law under which it arises. The case has to be determined in accordance with Scots Law: but it has been a matter of agreement between the experienced counsel who argued this case, and it appears to be the basis of the judgments of the learned judges of the Court of Session that for the purposes of determining this problem the law of Scotland and of England are the same. I speak with little authority on this point, but my own research such as it is satisfies me that the principles of the law of Scotland on such a question as the present are identical with those of English law: and I discuss the issue on that footing. The law of both countries appears to be that in order to support an action for damages for negligence the complainant has to show that he has been injured by the breach of duty owed to him in the circumstances by the defendant to take reasonable care to avoid such injury. In the present case we are not concerned with the breach of the duty; if a duty exists that would be a question of fact which is sufficiently averred and for the present purposes must be assumed. We are solely concerned with the question whether as a matter of law in the circumstances alleged the defender owed any duty to the pursuer to take care.

    It is remarkable how difficult it is to find in the English authorities statements of general application defining the relations between parties that give rise to the duty. The courts are concerned with the particular relations which come before them in actual litigation, and it is sufficient to say whether the duty exists in those circumstances. The result is that the courts have been engaged upon an elaborate classification of duties as they exist in respect of property whether real or personal with further divisions as to ownership, occupation or control, and distinctions based on the particular relations of the one side or the other whether manufacturer salesman or landlord, customer, tenant, stranger and so on. In this way it can be ascertained at any time whether the law recognises a duty, but only where the case can be referred to some particular species which has been examined and classified. And yet the duty which is common to all the cases where liability is established must logically be based upon some element common to the cases where it is found to exist. To seek a complete logical defini-

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